The efforts of Virginia General Assembly Delegates Bill Janis (R-Goochland County) and Charles Poindexter (R-Franklin County) to delay or kill the reappointment of Franklin County Circuit Judge William Alexander appear to be partisan politics at its worst. The two delegates’ actions could derail the most important law suit and trial in Virginia in decades—the suit against Virginia Tech officials by the parents of slain students Julia Pryde and Erin Peterson.
Judge Alexander recently ruled there is enough evidence of gross negligence that the suit against several current and former Virginia Tech officials, including school president, Charles Steger, can go forward. This ruling did not go over well with the right wing glitterati of Virginia’s body politic, some of whom argue no one can be held responsible for someone else’s actions. Therefore, Seung Hui Cho, and only Seung Hui Cho, is responsible for the mass killings at Virginia Tech.
The problem with that position is the failure to take into account the concept of “foreseeability,” a principle that says if the warning signs are readily apparent, and individuals who are aware of those signs do nothing, then those individuals can be held responsible for their inaction. If you look at the number of warning signs at Virginia Tech—the number is staggering. What more of a warning do you want than a professor threatening to resign unless a student (Cho) is removed from her class because she fears for her safety and the safety of her students?
Judge Alexander’s ruling was, therefore, a blow to the ostentatious right. Janis and Poindexter may have decided to seize another issue to delay or stop the judge’s reappointment in order to mask their real motive. It appears the issue they chose was Alexander’s decision to release a grand jury report after the indictment of Franklin County Sheriff Ewell Hunt. The sheriff was indicted on charges of keeping improper records about the employment of his daughter.
Delegate Janis has publicly acknowledged that the judge had the authority to release the report, which the judge did in response to a motion filed by the special prosecutor in the case, Pittsylvania County Commonwealth’s Attorney, David Grimes. If Judge Alexander had the right to grant the motion, then what is Delegate Janis doing other than playing politics?
It should also be noted that Sheriff Hunt is a Republican sheriff and his attorney is Bill Stanley, chairman of the Franklin County Republican Party. If the Judge’s ruling on the Virginia Tech lawsuit is not part of the two delegates’ motives, their actions are just as shameful. They would then be guilty of putting partisan politics ahead of school safety. The outcome of the lawsuit filed by the Pryde and Peterson families could easily spell the difference between safe and unsafe schools in this state. The simple fact is that unless people in positions of authority are held responsible for their actions; unless they understand they will pay a price for inaction, Virginia schools will never be safe.
NOTE: Mike Pohle alerted me the delaying tactics of Delegates Janis and Poindexter. Teresa and Michael Pohle lost their son, Michel, at Virginia Tech on April 15, 2007. Before publishing this blog, I asked Mike to comment on its content. The following are his comments:
My reaction is that this is just another of the never ending tactics on the part of state government to ensure the cover-up of the VT Massacre stays intact. In this instance, the charade is being orchestrated by Republicans to not only to protect a corrupt Republican Sheriff, but, the current Republican Governor. What is more appalling is that they do not care if they destroy the career, and integrity, of Judge Alexander. As long as their backsides are covered, that collateral damage is more than acceptable. This behavior also clearly demonstrates why the majority of Americans are correct in their low regard for politicians. My deceased father used to say that politicians were lower than used car salesmen. I send my apologies to used car salesmen for putting them in the same category.
Saturday, February 6, 2010
Tuesday, February 2, 2010
TRIDATA: THE WRONG COMPANY
You don’t send a policeman to put out a fire, and you don’t send a fireman to analyze a mass murder. But that is just what the state of Virginia did when it hired TriData to write Governor Kaine’s Review Panel Report of the shootings at Virginia Tech. TriData was apparently picked to write Governor Kaine’s Review Panel Report on Virginia Tech because the firm had done a report for the Department of Homeland Security on Columbine.
The problem is that the Columbine report is a completely different type of report than what was needed for Virginia Tech. The first two sentences on page one of the TriData Columbine report make that clear. “This report is an analysis of the fire service and emergency medical service (EMS) operations and the overall response to the assault on Columbine High School at Littleton, Colorado, on April 20, 1999. Incident command, special operations, and mass casualty emergency medical services are featured.”
Indeed, if you google the head of TriData, Philip Schaenman, one of the entries is entitled: “Fireman, Philip Schaenman.” His background includes fire administration and he is “known to the fire community for leading studies and research on first responder issues,” according to the Web site for TriData, whose products include titles such as “Fire in the United States” and “International Concepts in Fire Protection.”
The Columbine report is a better report than TriData’s effort on Virginia Tech, probably because it deals with an area that TriData knows something about—emergency responses by fire and medical services. The report never really analyzes the warning signs or the actions of people in positions of authority to the crisis on April 20, 1999.
That said, there are sections of the Columbine report that do pertain to the Virginia Tech tragedy. Inexplicably, though, those sections are not sufficiently developed in the Tech report. For example, the Columbine report repeatedly refers to the importance of the Incident Command System (ICS) in responding to a crisis. While the report refers to ICS with reference to fire service personnel managing major incidents and crises, a major flaw at Virginia Tech was the poor management at the ICS-equivalent level. Given the emphasis on the role of the ICS in the Columbine report, I am puzzled why TriData did not put greater emphasis on that point in the Virginia Tech report. Major breakdowns on April 16, 2007, were mismanagement and the poor decision-making after the double homicide at West Ambler Johnston—and before 30 more people were killed at Norris Hall nearly two and one-half hours later.
TriData’s Columbine report also provides some good insights about four technologies that enhance crisis response (pages 37-39). They are: surveillance technology; interagency communications; detection, disablement, and containment of explosive devices; and intelligence. It is the last one, “intelligence,” that points to a major flaw at Virginia Tech; a flaw, which to my knowledge, has not been adequately addressed or corrected. Here again, I am puzzled as to why TriData’s Virginia Tech report did not go into the lack of “intelligence” more than it did.
Specifically, the Columbine report indicates: “When responding units first arrived on the scene at the Columbine assault, they had little definitive intelligence upon which to rely. … The lack of intelligence data was exacerbated by the length of time it took to disseminate incoming information to personnel in the field. Maintaining an effective method to communicate intelligence data (location of suspects, background data on the suspects, number of suspects, appearance, etc.) to operations personnel is essential during chaotic and intense situations such as the Columbine incident.”
Other universities, such as the State University System of New York, have addressed the intelligence problem by installing cameras, conducting drills, making sure plans of all buildings are up to date, briefing students on what to do in a crisis, and creating a security system with the ability to lock down practically all buildings on campus with four stokes on a keypad. Virginia Tech has improved some aspects of its campus security and emergency response plans, but a case could be made that much more should be done at Tech, including the ability to lock down buildings. It is curious that TriData doesn’t stress “an effective method to communicate intelligence” and draw more from the related issues in its own Columbine report.
Again, you have to ask, “Why did Virginia pay a ‘fireman’ nearly three quarters of million dollars to produce a report that should have been done by crime specialists?” The problem with the Virginia Tech report may, in fact not be so much TriData, but Governor Kaine and then-Attorney General McDonnell. They apparently did not fully check out options other than TriData. For example, a far better model for the state of Virginia to follow would have been the 174 page report produced at the behest of Colorado Governor Bill Owens.
The problem is that the Columbine report is a completely different type of report than what was needed for Virginia Tech. The first two sentences on page one of the TriData Columbine report make that clear. “This report is an analysis of the fire service and emergency medical service (EMS) operations and the overall response to the assault on Columbine High School at Littleton, Colorado, on April 20, 1999. Incident command, special operations, and mass casualty emergency medical services are featured.”
Indeed, if you google the head of TriData, Philip Schaenman, one of the entries is entitled: “Fireman, Philip Schaenman.” His background includes fire administration and he is “known to the fire community for leading studies and research on first responder issues,” according to the Web site for TriData, whose products include titles such as “Fire in the United States” and “International Concepts in Fire Protection.”
The Columbine report is a better report than TriData’s effort on Virginia Tech, probably because it deals with an area that TriData knows something about—emergency responses by fire and medical services. The report never really analyzes the warning signs or the actions of people in positions of authority to the crisis on April 20, 1999.
That said, there are sections of the Columbine report that do pertain to the Virginia Tech tragedy. Inexplicably, though, those sections are not sufficiently developed in the Tech report. For example, the Columbine report repeatedly refers to the importance of the Incident Command System (ICS) in responding to a crisis. While the report refers to ICS with reference to fire service personnel managing major incidents and crises, a major flaw at Virginia Tech was the poor management at the ICS-equivalent level. Given the emphasis on the role of the ICS in the Columbine report, I am puzzled why TriData did not put greater emphasis on that point in the Virginia Tech report. Major breakdowns on April 16, 2007, were mismanagement and the poor decision-making after the double homicide at West Ambler Johnston—and before 30 more people were killed at Norris Hall nearly two and one-half hours later.
TriData’s Columbine report also provides some good insights about four technologies that enhance crisis response (pages 37-39). They are: surveillance technology; interagency communications; detection, disablement, and containment of explosive devices; and intelligence. It is the last one, “intelligence,” that points to a major flaw at Virginia Tech; a flaw, which to my knowledge, has not been adequately addressed or corrected. Here again, I am puzzled as to why TriData’s Virginia Tech report did not go into the lack of “intelligence” more than it did.
Specifically, the Columbine report indicates: “When responding units first arrived on the scene at the Columbine assault, they had little definitive intelligence upon which to rely. … The lack of intelligence data was exacerbated by the length of time it took to disseminate incoming information to personnel in the field. Maintaining an effective method to communicate intelligence data (location of suspects, background data on the suspects, number of suspects, appearance, etc.) to operations personnel is essential during chaotic and intense situations such as the Columbine incident.”
Other universities, such as the State University System of New York, have addressed the intelligence problem by installing cameras, conducting drills, making sure plans of all buildings are up to date, briefing students on what to do in a crisis, and creating a security system with the ability to lock down practically all buildings on campus with four stokes on a keypad. Virginia Tech has improved some aspects of its campus security and emergency response plans, but a case could be made that much more should be done at Tech, including the ability to lock down buildings. It is curious that TriData doesn’t stress “an effective method to communicate intelligence” and draw more from the related issues in its own Columbine report.
Again, you have to ask, “Why did Virginia pay a ‘fireman’ nearly three quarters of million dollars to produce a report that should have been done by crime specialists?” The problem with the Virginia Tech report may, in fact not be so much TriData, but Governor Kaine and then-Attorney General McDonnell. They apparently did not fully check out options other than TriData. For example, a far better model for the state of Virginia to follow would have been the 174 page report produced at the behest of Colorado Governor Bill Owens.
Monday, January 18, 2010
HAS HINCKER READ THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN?
The more you look at the words of Virginia Tech officials regarding the April 16, 2007 shooting tragedy, the more you realize they will say just about anything—without checking the facts. For example, in August, 2006, William Morva escaped from custody and killed two people. Virginia Tech closed down in response to the threat. Morva was captured on university property. Following the incident, a review of the university’s Emergency Response Plan (ERP) recommended adding a section dealing with armed and dangerous individuals on campus to the ERP.
Virginia Tech spokesperson, Larry Hincker, however, is quoted in the May 23, 2007 edition of the Roanoke Times as saying, “After we went back and looked at that (the plan), we felt that was not a correct assessment of our emergency plan…” Hincker then asserted that the emergency plan did mention a plan for armed intruders on campus.
I have read the Emergency Response Plan, and I find no reference to armed intruders. The recommendations following the Morva incident, therefore, were correct and Hincker was wrong. Guidance on dealing with armed and dangerous individuals should have been added to the report—and the university was alerted to that need. The obvious question is, had such a section been added, would Tech have been better prepared to deal with Cho’s killing rampage?
The ERP indicates that the Cho’s initial double homicide met the Level III incident criteria. This fact raises the question, why didn’t the school follow more closely the guidelines that did exist? A Level III incident is defined as: “An incident occurring at the university that adversely impacts or threatens life, health or property at the university on a large scale. Control of the incident will require specialists in addition to university and outside agency personnel. Long-term implications may result.”
Under the criteria for a Level III incident there are some important points that indicate the university should have taken immediate action after discovering the homicides at Ambler West Johnston dormitory. Look at the first criterion for the “resolution” of a Level III incident—it was met. That criterion reads: “Serious hazard or severe threat to life, health, and property.” The fifth criterion was also met. It reads: “Duration of event is unpredictable.”
Even if you look at a Level II incident, as defined by the plan, clearly the school should have warned immediately. The first sentence of the definition of a Level II reads: “An unplanned event of unpredictable duration that may adversely impact or threaten life, health or property on a large scale at one or more locations within the university.” Those words call for immediate action.
Another of Hincker’s spins of the school’s actions is the explanation of why the Virginia Tech delayed in issuing a campus-wide warning. The reason for the school’s timidity in issuing a warning was the so-called panic that occurred when a warning was issued during the Morva incident eight months earlier. The panic—which was not really a panic, but the circulation of unfounded, alarming rumors—centered on false stories that Morva had taken a hostage in Tech’s Squires Student Center. Police did surround the Student Center, and students leaving the facility did find officers with drawn weapons, but to call it a panic appears to be a gross exaggeration.
Perhaps the most blatant self-serving explanation of the school’s inaction comes from Virginia Tech President Charles Steger. He is quoted as saying that the “panic” at the time of the Morva incident created a dangerous situation that could have cost hundreds of lives. This comment is a feeble attempt to white-wash Steger’s inaction on the morning of April 16, 2007.
Virginia Tech spokesperson, Larry Hincker, however, is quoted in the May 23, 2007 edition of the Roanoke Times as saying, “After we went back and looked at that (the plan), we felt that was not a correct assessment of our emergency plan…” Hincker then asserted that the emergency plan did mention a plan for armed intruders on campus.
I have read the Emergency Response Plan, and I find no reference to armed intruders. The recommendations following the Morva incident, therefore, were correct and Hincker was wrong. Guidance on dealing with armed and dangerous individuals should have been added to the report—and the university was alerted to that need. The obvious question is, had such a section been added, would Tech have been better prepared to deal with Cho’s killing rampage?
The ERP indicates that the Cho’s initial double homicide met the Level III incident criteria. This fact raises the question, why didn’t the school follow more closely the guidelines that did exist? A Level III incident is defined as: “An incident occurring at the university that adversely impacts or threatens life, health or property at the university on a large scale. Control of the incident will require specialists in addition to university and outside agency personnel. Long-term implications may result.”
Under the criteria for a Level III incident there are some important points that indicate the university should have taken immediate action after discovering the homicides at Ambler West Johnston dormitory. Look at the first criterion for the “resolution” of a Level III incident—it was met. That criterion reads: “Serious hazard or severe threat to life, health, and property.” The fifth criterion was also met. It reads: “Duration of event is unpredictable.”
Even if you look at a Level II incident, as defined by the plan, clearly the school should have warned immediately. The first sentence of the definition of a Level II reads: “An unplanned event of unpredictable duration that may adversely impact or threaten life, health or property on a large scale at one or more locations within the university.” Those words call for immediate action.
Another of Hincker’s spins of the school’s actions is the explanation of why the Virginia Tech delayed in issuing a campus-wide warning. The reason for the school’s timidity in issuing a warning was the so-called panic that occurred when a warning was issued during the Morva incident eight months earlier. The panic—which was not really a panic, but the circulation of unfounded, alarming rumors—centered on false stories that Morva had taken a hostage in Tech’s Squires Student Center. Police did surround the Student Center, and students leaving the facility did find officers with drawn weapons, but to call it a panic appears to be a gross exaggeration.
Perhaps the most blatant self-serving explanation of the school’s inaction comes from Virginia Tech President Charles Steger. He is quoted as saying that the “panic” at the time of the Morva incident created a dangerous situation that could have cost hundreds of lives. This comment is a feeble attempt to white-wash Steger’s inaction on the morning of April 16, 2007.
Friday, January 15, 2010
THE ROANOKE TIMES: PART OF THE PROBLEM
The “Roanoke Times” January 8, 2010 editorial calling on Virginia to close the books on Governor Kaine’s Review Panel Report on the shootings at Virginia Tech is a badly misguided attempt to get people to move ahead with the healing process.
Unfortunately, the “Roanoke Times” misses the point. The state paid TriData over half million dollars for a badly flawed report and then rewarded the company for shoddy work by giving them another $75,000.00 to revise the document. The revisions were based on the work of the victims’ families. But TriData accepted only a fraction of corrections—just enough to say they did something, not enough to present the whole truth. Had the company accepted all the corrections, it would have been an admission of how poor the initial report was.
What more evidence does the “Roanoke Times” want than the ruling by Franklin County Circuit Court Judge William Alexander that the law suit by two of the victims’ families can go forward? The judge decided there is evidence of gross negligence by the school president, other school administration officials, and the Cook Counseling Center. The TriData report only hinted at bad judgments; not gross negligence—a cover-up?
In fact, TriData already has had business dealings with the state of Virginia. Does the “Roanoke Times” think TriData would risk future lucrative contracts with the state by identifying the state’s largest university as being run by people who are grossly negligent?
The sad truth is that the TriData report comes close to being out-and-out theft of tax payer money.
I teach Intelligence and crime analysis and use the TriData report in my classes as an example of incompetence in research, analysis, and writing. For example, the timeline in the original report is inaccurate and there are numerous omissions. The narrative of the report flows from the timeline. How can you believe anything if the timeline is flawed? It just doesn’t make sense. Not one of my students defends the TriData report as an acceptable analysis of this nation’s worst school shootings.
Unfortunately, the “Roanoke Times,” in covering the April 16, 2007 tragedy, has frequently pulled its punches. Other newspapers, such as the “Richmond Times-Dispatch” have aggressively pursued investigative journalism to get at the truth. The “Roanoke Times” has not.
What a shame; the leading newspaper in southwest Virginia shying away from the best journalistic standards and not searching for the truth. Instead, the paper apparently decided to bend over backwards to avoid offending the largest economic engine in that part of the state—Virginia Tech University. You can easily argue that the failure of the “Roanoke Times” to pursue good, investigative journalism is part of the problem we face today, and part of the reason why we are still searching for the truth and accountability.
Unfortunately, the “Roanoke Times” misses the point. The state paid TriData over half million dollars for a badly flawed report and then rewarded the company for shoddy work by giving them another $75,000.00 to revise the document. The revisions were based on the work of the victims’ families. But TriData accepted only a fraction of corrections—just enough to say they did something, not enough to present the whole truth. Had the company accepted all the corrections, it would have been an admission of how poor the initial report was.
What more evidence does the “Roanoke Times” want than the ruling by Franklin County Circuit Court Judge William Alexander that the law suit by two of the victims’ families can go forward? The judge decided there is evidence of gross negligence by the school president, other school administration officials, and the Cook Counseling Center. The TriData report only hinted at bad judgments; not gross negligence—a cover-up?
In fact, TriData already has had business dealings with the state of Virginia. Does the “Roanoke Times” think TriData would risk future lucrative contracts with the state by identifying the state’s largest university as being run by people who are grossly negligent?
The sad truth is that the TriData report comes close to being out-and-out theft of tax payer money.
I teach Intelligence and crime analysis and use the TriData report in my classes as an example of incompetence in research, analysis, and writing. For example, the timeline in the original report is inaccurate and there are numerous omissions. The narrative of the report flows from the timeline. How can you believe anything if the timeline is flawed? It just doesn’t make sense. Not one of my students defends the TriData report as an acceptable analysis of this nation’s worst school shootings.
Unfortunately, the “Roanoke Times,” in covering the April 16, 2007 tragedy, has frequently pulled its punches. Other newspapers, such as the “Richmond Times-Dispatch” have aggressively pursued investigative journalism to get at the truth. The “Roanoke Times” has not.
What a shame; the leading newspaper in southwest Virginia shying away from the best journalistic standards and not searching for the truth. Instead, the paper apparently decided to bend over backwards to avoid offending the largest economic engine in that part of the state—Virginia Tech University. You can easily argue that the failure of the “Roanoke Times” to pursue good, investigative journalism is part of the problem we face today, and part of the reason why we are still searching for the truth and accountability.
Thursday, January 14, 2010
LAW SUIT GOES FORWARD
The ruling by Franklin County Circuit Court Judge William Alexander II that major parts of the law suit against Virginia Tech President Charles Steger and former executive Vice President James Hyatt can go forward, may mean that—at last—the truth will probably come out and people will be held responsible what they did and did not do. The judge’s ruling also clears the way for the suit to go ahead against three Cook Counseling Center employees, former director Robert Miller and staff members Sherry Lynch-Conrad and Cahtye Betzel.
The law suit was filed by the parents of slain students Julia Pryde and Erin Peterson. The judge, in making his ruling, indicated that the plaintiffs presented enough evidence of gross negligence that principle of sovereign immunity is overruled and the law suit can go ahead--a trial is warranted.
Sovereign immunity, a doctrine going back to English common law, states that the sovereign (in Virginia’s case, the state and state institutions) cannot be suited unless there is evidence of gross negligence. The judge found that evidence. The cases against Virginia Tech’s Cook Counseling Center and some staff members and all other school defendants were dismissed on grounds of sovereign immunity.
The ruling does not mean there will be a trial. Lawyers for the defendants are bound to file appeals. But it is hard to imagine an Appeals Court overturning Judge Alexander’s ruling. A trial is vitally important to discovering the truth about what happened that horrific day, learning from the mistakes that were obviously made, and finally, holding people accountable for their actions and inactions. This last point is critical. Until people are held accountable—particularly where there is negligence—there is absolutely no incentive to make sure our schools are safe.
Putting people under oath is the only way to get at the truth—but even that is no guarantee. If there is a trial, there are many other problems that will have to be dealt with. I am sure many Virginia Tech employees will have selective memories about what happened that day. “I don’t remember” is a phrase heard too often in trials to cover-up evidence of a crime or gross negligence. There is also the well known principle of the “test-a-lie.” It is sad, but I know cases where lawyers have told witnesses to lie in order to make the evidence fit the lawyer’s case. I doubt if that will happen, but be prepared.
The law suit was filed by the parents of slain students Julia Pryde and Erin Peterson. The judge, in making his ruling, indicated that the plaintiffs presented enough evidence of gross negligence that principle of sovereign immunity is overruled and the law suit can go ahead--a trial is warranted.
Sovereign immunity, a doctrine going back to English common law, states that the sovereign (in Virginia’s case, the state and state institutions) cannot be suited unless there is evidence of gross negligence. The judge found that evidence. The cases against Virginia Tech’s Cook Counseling Center and some staff members and all other school defendants were dismissed on grounds of sovereign immunity.
The ruling does not mean there will be a trial. Lawyers for the defendants are bound to file appeals. But it is hard to imagine an Appeals Court overturning Judge Alexander’s ruling. A trial is vitally important to discovering the truth about what happened that horrific day, learning from the mistakes that were obviously made, and finally, holding people accountable for their actions and inactions. This last point is critical. Until people are held accountable—particularly where there is negligence—there is absolutely no incentive to make sure our schools are safe.
Putting people under oath is the only way to get at the truth—but even that is no guarantee. If there is a trial, there are many other problems that will have to be dealt with. I am sure many Virginia Tech employees will have selective memories about what happened that day. “I don’t remember” is a phrase heard too often in trials to cover-up evidence of a crime or gross negligence. There is also the well known principle of the “test-a-lie.” It is sad, but I know cases where lawyers have told witnesses to lie in order to make the evidence fit the lawyer’s case. I doubt if that will happen, but be prepared.
Sunday, January 10, 2010
EQUITAS DOCUMENTS VIRGINIA TECH BLUNDERS
The EQUITAS Legal Report* on the shootings at Virginia Tech makes a strong case that the school violated a federal law (the Clery Act) and that the school and senior school administration officials may be guilty of obstruction of justice.
The report asserts that the multi-level chain of command adopted by Virginia Tech on that terrible day may have prevented a timely warning from being issued to students, faculty, and staff. This cumbersome bureaucratic process violated both the Clery Act and the school’s own security policy. To make this point, EQUITAS quotes from VT Policy No. 5613 v.3, dated May 2002, which states, “University Relations and the University Police will make the campus community aware of crimes, which have occurred and necessitate caution on the part of students and employees, in a timely fashion and in such a way as to aid in the prevention of similar occurrences.”
Virginia Tech Police Chief Flinchum clearly had the authority to issue an alarm, but did not. He talked with school administration officials—the president and members of the policy group—and it stretches the limits of credibility to think that an alarm and a lock-down were not discussed. They would all be negligent in their duties had they not discussed these courses of actions. Virginia Tech policy lacks specifics regarding the type of information to be found in any form of timely warning, but to use that lack of specificity as an excuse for not warning the campus when two students have been murdered and bloody footprints lead away from the crime scene, is—I believe—bureaucratic mumbo-jumbo designed to cover-up poor judgments. Furthermore, EQUITAS correctly points out that the school’s failure to alert was also based on “the unsubstantiated fear of chaos supposedly witnessed during the handling of the Morva incident.” (William Morva escaped from a Blacksburg, Virginia jail in August, 2006, killing two officers. He was eventually caught on university property. Virginia Tech did take action that day, cancelling classes, and setting its own security standard just eight months before Cho’s shooting rampage—a standard that the school broke on April 16, 2007.)
The SERAPH Research Team, a group of education and law enforcement experts, supports the findings of the EQUITAS Legal Report. SERAPH contends that the school’s actions—specifically the Policy Group—may have been in violation of Virginia Criminal code 18.2-460A dealing with Obstruction of Justice. Specifically, the action of the Policy Group, and/or members of the school administration, may have obstructed the police in their investigation of the original dorm murders and the police’s response to managing the campus with a murder suspect on the loose.
Even if you believe that the first two killings could not have been prevented (I do not accept that premise), there is no doubt that the school committed one error after another as it blundered through the nearly two and a half hours between the killings at West Ambler Johnston dormitory and the slaughter at Norris Hall.
As EQUITAS puts it, “Careful scrutiny of the relevant indica contained in this (EQUITAS) Legal Report provides the reasonable and well-informed person the means to connect the dots and draw the line as to why the State of Virginia and VT both failed in securing procedural and substantive safeguards recognized by international and domestic law.” EQUITAS underscores the responsibilities that Virginia Tech and all colleges and universities have for the safety of students by citing Mullins v. Pine Manor College (1983). In that case, the court opined, “Parents, students and the general community still have a reasonable expectation, fostered in part by the colleges themselves, that reasonable care will be exercised to protect students from foreseeable harm.” Cho’s murderous rage was foreseeable, a campus-wide alert and lock-down was “reasonable care … to protect students from foreseeable harm.” Clearly, Virginia Tech violated the Clery Act and under the provisions of that Act, should be denied federal funds.
In concluding their report, EQUITAS correctly points out “the important point is that VA State as well as the Virginia Tech Board and police authorities, egregiously neglected—for a variety of reasons—to bring together and fully appreciate a range of information that could have greatly enhanced their claims of uncovering and preventing the attacker’s plan …”
The EQUITAS report ends with the insightful assertion that “Securing the Truth and ensuring Restorative Justice can only be attained through an independent and impartial judicial hearing whose task of exposing the crux of the matter would contribute in resolving the question as to why VA state and VT egregiously neglected to implement and administer valid procedural and substantive safeguards and at securing the broad Va. Tech and Blacksburg community against Level II type incidents involving acts of terrorism and mass causalities.”
Having read the excellent EQUITAS Legal Report and analyses done by other law enforcement, legal, and educational officials, I have no choice but to agree with them—there is ample evidence that Virginia Tech violated state and federal laws on April 16, 2007. The evidence—both factual and circumstantial—is strong enough that the threshold for a court trial has been met. You can find full text of the EQUITAS Legal Report by going to http://www.eqrolc.ca/.
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*EQUITAS was founded in 2002 and is based in Canada. Daniel Couture is the founder of EQUITAS. Mr. Couture’s sister, Professor Jocelyne Couture-Nowak, was a French professor and was murdered at Virginia Tech on April 16, 2007. EQUITAS is a strategic rule-of-law think tank operating in conformity with the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders adopted by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/53/144.
The report asserts that the multi-level chain of command adopted by Virginia Tech on that terrible day may have prevented a timely warning from being issued to students, faculty, and staff. This cumbersome bureaucratic process violated both the Clery Act and the school’s own security policy. To make this point, EQUITAS quotes from VT Policy No. 5613 v.3, dated May 2002, which states, “University Relations and the University Police will make the campus community aware of crimes, which have occurred and necessitate caution on the part of students and employees, in a timely fashion and in such a way as to aid in the prevention of similar occurrences.”
Virginia Tech Police Chief Flinchum clearly had the authority to issue an alarm, but did not. He talked with school administration officials—the president and members of the policy group—and it stretches the limits of credibility to think that an alarm and a lock-down were not discussed. They would all be negligent in their duties had they not discussed these courses of actions. Virginia Tech policy lacks specifics regarding the type of information to be found in any form of timely warning, but to use that lack of specificity as an excuse for not warning the campus when two students have been murdered and bloody footprints lead away from the crime scene, is—I believe—bureaucratic mumbo-jumbo designed to cover-up poor judgments. Furthermore, EQUITAS correctly points out that the school’s failure to alert was also based on “the unsubstantiated fear of chaos supposedly witnessed during the handling of the Morva incident.” (William Morva escaped from a Blacksburg, Virginia jail in August, 2006, killing two officers. He was eventually caught on university property. Virginia Tech did take action that day, cancelling classes, and setting its own security standard just eight months before Cho’s shooting rampage—a standard that the school broke on April 16, 2007.)
The SERAPH Research Team, a group of education and law enforcement experts, supports the findings of the EQUITAS Legal Report. SERAPH contends that the school’s actions—specifically the Policy Group—may have been in violation of Virginia Criminal code 18.2-460A dealing with Obstruction of Justice. Specifically, the action of the Policy Group, and/or members of the school administration, may have obstructed the police in their investigation of the original dorm murders and the police’s response to managing the campus with a murder suspect on the loose.
Even if you believe that the first two killings could not have been prevented (I do not accept that premise), there is no doubt that the school committed one error after another as it blundered through the nearly two and a half hours between the killings at West Ambler Johnston dormitory and the slaughter at Norris Hall.
As EQUITAS puts it, “Careful scrutiny of the relevant indica contained in this (EQUITAS) Legal Report provides the reasonable and well-informed person the means to connect the dots and draw the line as to why the State of Virginia and VT both failed in securing procedural and substantive safeguards recognized by international and domestic law.” EQUITAS underscores the responsibilities that Virginia Tech and all colleges and universities have for the safety of students by citing Mullins v. Pine Manor College (1983). In that case, the court opined, “Parents, students and the general community still have a reasonable expectation, fostered in part by the colleges themselves, that reasonable care will be exercised to protect students from foreseeable harm.” Cho’s murderous rage was foreseeable, a campus-wide alert and lock-down was “reasonable care … to protect students from foreseeable harm.” Clearly, Virginia Tech violated the Clery Act and under the provisions of that Act, should be denied federal funds.
In concluding their report, EQUITAS correctly points out “the important point is that VA State as well as the Virginia Tech Board and police authorities, egregiously neglected—for a variety of reasons—to bring together and fully appreciate a range of information that could have greatly enhanced their claims of uncovering and preventing the attacker’s plan …”
The EQUITAS report ends with the insightful assertion that “Securing the Truth and ensuring Restorative Justice can only be attained through an independent and impartial judicial hearing whose task of exposing the crux of the matter would contribute in resolving the question as to why VA state and VT egregiously neglected to implement and administer valid procedural and substantive safeguards and at securing the broad Va. Tech and Blacksburg community against Level II type incidents involving acts of terrorism and mass causalities.”
Having read the excellent EQUITAS Legal Report and analyses done by other law enforcement, legal, and educational officials, I have no choice but to agree with them—there is ample evidence that Virginia Tech violated state and federal laws on April 16, 2007. The evidence—both factual and circumstantial—is strong enough that the threshold for a court trial has been met. You can find full text of the EQUITAS Legal Report by going to http://www.eqrolc.ca/.
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*EQUITAS was founded in 2002 and is based in Canada. Daniel Couture is the founder of EQUITAS. Mr. Couture’s sister, Professor Jocelyne Couture-Nowak, was a French professor and was murdered at Virginia Tech on April 16, 2007. EQUITAS is a strategic rule-of-law think tank operating in conformity with the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders adopted by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/53/144.
VIRGINIA TECH VICTIMS’ WEB SITE
The families of the victims’ of the April 16, 2007 mass shooting at Virginia Tech have set up a Web site. I urge all readers of this blog to check http://april16thvictimsvoice.org/index.html regularly for updates on the families’ concerns and writings about the tragedy. The site also contains contact information. If anyone has any information or questions about the shootings you can contact the families through the Web site.
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