Saturday, April 8, 2017

FOR SUZANNE GRIMES NO DOUBT, VIRGINIA TECH BROKE THE LAW

 

For Suzanne Grimes, whose son Kevin Sterne survived the shooting, there is no doubt; not only did Tech break the law in failing to warn, but it mounted a campaign to use the tragedy for monetary gain.

Suzanne, just as the Strollos, lived near Pittsburgh in April 2007. On the 16th she was out shopping for Kevin’s upcoming graduation. She wanted to do something special to honor her son’s accomplishment. Sometime around 11:30 a.m., her sister in New Mexico reached Suzanne by cell phone and asked if she had heard about the shooting at Virginia Tech. She had not, and immediately went home. She tried first to reach her husband and then her son, but no such luck.

There was no answer on Kevin’s cell phone, but she was not alarmed. Kevin’s phone bill is part of the family’s Verizon account, so Grimes printed the latest bill and began calling numbers identified with Kevin’s phone. She also kept calling Kevin’s number, but still no answer. One of the first numbers to answer was Kevin’s roommate Joe. He had not heard about the shooting, but tried to reassure Suzanne that Kevin was ok. But, Joe added, “Kevin is usually home for lunch by now, and he is not here.”

Suzanne persisted. The next number to answer was Kevin’s good friend Marcus. This time the tone was somber. Marcus said Kevin was in the building where the shootings had taken place and there was a good chance he had been shot. Suzanne tried to reassure a badly shaken Marcus that everything would be all right, but when she hung up the phone she started crying uncontrollably.

An emotionally distraught Suzanne finally got through to her husband who said he would be right home. They would leave for Blacksburg immediately. Suzanne did not stop to pack, she just kept calling and calling: first Kevin’s number and then the school or a number on the phone bill list, then Kevin. She kept the routine up.  Suzanne finally reached someone who said she was on President Steger’s staff—possibly his secretary. She doesn’t remember the woman’s name, all she remembers are her words, “We don’t know what is going on.”

Now frantic, Suzanne called the Virginia Tech police asking about her son. They had no information and told her to call the state police, who in turn told her to phone the Blacksburg police. Around and around the phone calls went. She kept getting the same people, none of whom could tell her anything. Her emotions were now raw.  Each time she reached the police she could hear the growing panic in their voices.

Suzanne had been working on a graduation poster for Kevin. The poster lay on the table near the phone and included pictures of Kevin as a child. Every time she looked over at her unfinished work she broke down sobbing.

All of a sudden her fright exploded. Suppose Kevin is hiding from the killer, his phone is on and her phone calls alert the killer to her son’s hiding place? Suppose the killer finds Kevin because of what she is doing and kills him? The fright was crippling; the emotional pain was excruciating.

From that point on she concentrated on phoning the police. At one point she was told she should call the morgue. She did, but again, no word—no answers.

By 1:30 p.m. the Grimes were speeding toward Blacksburg. Suzanne was beside herself; she was on the phone one call after another. She just kept dialing one number after another, hoping against hope she would hear Kevin was not hurt or worse yet, dead.

Sometime around 4:30 p.m. she got through to the Montgomery Regional Hospital. The hospital spokesperson said they had a survivor named Kevin, but could not say whether it was her son. At that point Suzanne reached one of Kevin’s friends who had gone to the hospital. The friend could not tell the Grimes anything specific, but said if you have a picture of him on your phone, send it to me and I will give it to the hospital officials. Suzanne found a picture, and sent it. The photo was taken into the operating room, and moments later Suzanne was told the survivor was her son. Suzanne remembers, “We were afraid to believe it was him, we were still skeptical. There are no words to describe the relief.” By now Suzanne was an emotional wreck; she was physically and emotionally exhausted. She was told that as soon as Kevin was awake they would have him call.

Grimes found out that her son had been the last survivor to be removed from Norris Hall. It had taken 51 minutes to get him to Montgomery Regional Hospital. She would also come to know that Kevin used skills he had learned in the Boy Scouts to stem the hemorrhaging in his leg and save his life.

There are no words in the English language to describe her feelings when she heard her son’s voice. When Kevin called, Suzanne could tell he was on heavy medication; she would later find out it was morphine. His voice sounded so good, it sounded so sweet even though the painkillers had taken their toll. When the hospital doctor called his first words were, “I have saved his life, I am not sure I can save his leg.” Kevin, just as Hilary Strollo, had lost over two-thirds of his blood. Fortunately, the doctor did save Kevin’s leg and through the young man’s grit and determination, he walked across the stage to get his graduation diploma that spring. Kevin’s action was the true embodiment of the Hokie spirit.

For the Grimes, once in Blacksburg, it did not take long for them to realize something was amiss with the school. It was readily apparent to them—the school had something to hide. The first few days passed in something of a daze, but they quickly came to realize they were not being told the whole truth. They were plagued with questions about why the school failed to issue a timely warning. But no one could or would explain the school’s actions and inactions on that fateful day.

The Grimes family managed to get the last available room at the Inn at Virginia Tech. Suzanne remembers the atmosphere as chaotic, bordering on mass hysteria. There were security checks everywhere. The Grimes were put at the end of the hall on the fourth floor—the floor where all the families of the dead were staying. Walking through that corridor was a terrible journey through unending grief and agony. Again Suzanne asked herself, why didn’t the school warn there was a killer on the loose?

Again Grimes asked herself, why were these families being put though this excruciating pain when a warning would almost certainly have saved 30 lives and prevented 17 from being wounded? Why have all of us had to suffer this, when it could have been avoided?

At one point Suzanne bumped into Dr. Ralph Diner (I will discuss, in future posts, the role Dr. Diner appears to have actually played), the grief counselor hired by Firestorm the crisis management company used by Virginia Tech for ten days following the shootings. The two exchanged a few words and she only remembers Diner saying, “Tech has some issues.”

Suzanne took a few phone calls, including one from the press. She was asked to fax a picture of her son for use in a newspaper article. No sooner did she comply with the request than she began thinking it was the wrong thing to do—suppose someone wanted to come back and kill Kevin.

Suzanne Grimes was entering a long period of fear and anxiety. For months and years she would be haunted by the thought that someone would still come and kill her son. As long as she stayed in Blacksburg, she felt relatively safe, because of the police and security presence. But once she returned to Pittsburgh, all the horror, shock, and fear came back with a vengeance. Back at home she locked all the doors and pulled all the shades. Her anxiety was so great that she had to go on medication. Again, she asked, “How could Tech not have warned there was a killer on the loose, how could they be so naïve to think that someone who had killed twice would not do it again?”

By July of 2007, Suzanne was beginning to make some progress toward regaining a degree of normalcy. It was at that time the Grimes received a phone call from the FBI office in Pittsburgh wanting to meet and talk with Kevin. The FBI agents wanted to hear, first hand, the account of the shootings. Kevin agreed and his mother accompanied him to the Bureau’s office. As she listened to her son recount graphic detail after detail of Cho’s methodical slaughter she felt she was going into shock. Kevin’s words brought back anew the horror of what her son had gone through and survived. Her nightmares returned. The stress of what she had heard from her son’s lips was so great that she had to remain on medication.

Suzanne Grimes would later find out that Tech President Charles Steger visited her son’s hospital room, but only after his parents had left. For Suzanne, Steger’s action was infuriating; it was the act of a coward. She could only say to herself, “How dare that man come into my son’s hospital room when his parents were not there?”

In the weeks and months that followed, Grimes more and more believed the families were being manipulated. The school did assign a liaison officer to the family, but Grimes shared a feeling felt by many of the families—the main purpose of this liaison officer was to string the families along, to tell them as little as possible, and to try to prevent the families from talking to each other and to the press. This feeling was reinforced by the fact that the school, through the liaison officer, was often unresponsive to the Grimes’ simplest requests and rarely answered questions.

Grimes also had the impression that Kenneth Feinberg, the noted U.S. attorney who handled, pro bono, the Hokie Spirit Memorial Fund (HSMF), was a central player in making sure the families were controlled. (I will examine the machinations surrounding the HSMF in future posts) Suzanne Grimes vividly remembers a meeting in August 2007 with Feinberg concerning the HSMF. Time and time again during the meeting, she asked Feinberg pointed questions about how the money was being. She found his answers vague and evasive.

Grimes also clearly remembers the way Feinberg had the families exit that meeting to keep them away from the press—he apparently wanted to be in complete control of the message concerning the millions of dollars that were flooding into the school. Feinberg was a key player in the distribution of the HSMF money and for some reason he could not, or would not, fully answer Suzanne Grimes’s questions.

For the Pohle, Strollo, White, and Grimes families, there is no doubt, Virginia Tech not only violated the Clery Act, but the Steger administration violated common sense and good judgment. But don’t take my word for it. You, the reader, need to examine the legal aspects of the case against the school on the following pages and decide for yourself. (To be continued)



Friday, April 7, 2017

NEVER KICK A SOCCER PLAYER



When I wrote my book, on the Virginia Tech massacre, I invited families of the victims to write about their experiences and thoughts. I will be posting those responses over the next few weeks. Here are the comments of Dr. Diane Strollo, whose daughter Hilary was wounded on April 16, 2007:

For Dr. Diane Strollo and her family there is no doubt, Tech betrayed its students and faculty and violated the law.

Dr. Strollo was at home in suburban Pittsburgh on that frigid blustering April morning when her husband called to tell her there had been a shooting at Virginia Tech, and their daughter, Hilary, had been shot. Strollo was stunned. In a state of disbelief, Diane Strollo kept wondering, “How could she be shot on a Monday morning at college?”

Doctor Strollo vividly remembers getting a phone call from Dr. Dick Davis saying that he was taking Hilary into surgery for three gunshot wounds. By sheer luck and circumstance, considering the mayhem, the loss of so many Hokies, and the extent of her injuries, Hilary was rescued from Norris Hall in the second ambulance to leave the crime scene. Dr. Strollo was fortified by the fact that Hilary was rock steady, physically fit, and an avid soccer player. On the soccer field, kick her and she kicks back.

The news was at first incomprehensible and would become more so, particularly as the Strollos learned about the Virginia Tech leadership’s anemic response to the first murders and the months of ignoring the warning signs leading up to Cho’s actions. As the details began to emerge, the Strollos became more and more puzzled by Virginia Tech’s handling of the initial shootings. In addition, they questioned how members of the school administration (for example – Kim O’Rourke and Edward Spencer) could notify their own loved ones about the shooting, but not alert the entire campus and community.  

The Strollo’s son, Patrick, was a senior at Virginia Tech. He heard about the shootings, and he knew Hilary had class in Norris Hall. Fortuitously, one of Patrick’s friends was a patient (not related to the shootings) in the emergency department of the Montgomery Regional Hospital when Hilary was transported in. The friend heard Hilary’s name and called Patrick immediately to say his sister had been shot. Patrick, in turn, called his father.

The Strollos needed to get to Blacksburg immediately, but strong winds and bad weather had forced the cancellation of all flights out of Pittsburgh, so they drove—in record time. They could not think to pack suitcases, only to pick up their other daughter, Sara, and to get to Virginia Tech as quickly as possible.

Hilary was critically injured but survived. The first days in the intensive care unit were an emotional roller coaster, as were the surgeries yet to come. It took three days to discover the scope of who was lost or injured and to learn that the professor Hilary loved and admired, Madame Couture-Nowak, had died of her injuries while trying to protect her class. But by the end of the week, Dr. Strollo kept coming back to the discrepancy that more than two hours had lapsed between the initial shootings and the Norris Hall carnage. She was disturbed when she learned that the police allowed two students (Rachel Hill and Henry Lee), to leave West Ambler Johnston Hall to go French class in Norris Hall—only to be murdered there. Hill, the first to be struck down in French class, had arrived late. Hill had called her father on the way to Norris Hall to tell him that she was “okay.”

As the details came into sharper focus, the same question kept eating away at the Strollos: how could the leadership of Virginia Tech not have issued a timely warning? The school knew two students were murdered and that there was an armed gunman at large. Dr. Strollo was mystified that the school had the time and technology to warn the campus but chose not to. Strollo would later find out that the school also chose not to immediately notify the families of the two deceased students. However, the school did notify Governor Timothy Kaine’s office at 8:30 a.m., which was one hour and fifteen minutes before the carnage at Norris Hall. The Strollos kept thinking how odd it was, how curious to notify the governor but not your faculty and students.

Dr. Strollo knew her daughter and most students would have used caution had they been warned. In fact, because of the bomb threats on the campus and the closure of four academic building three days earlier, on April 13, 2007, Hilary had checked the Virginia Tech Web page at 9:00 a.m. on the 16th to see if Norris Hall was open. There was no mention of the 7:15 a.m. shootings, so she proceeded to class. The anger the Strollos felt began to grow as they realized the victims of Norris Hall did not have the advantage given to the families and loved ones of Dr. Steger and his Policy Group. Had there been an accurate and timely warning many lives might have been saved. In fact, several students who did not attend French class that fateful morning said they decided to miss class after hearing about a “shooting.”  It would seem the rumor saved them. How many more might have been saved by an official warning?

To this day, the Strollos ask, “Why would leadership hesitate to notify the campus of two unsolved murders on campus?  For any campus security expert, April is a high profile month for terrorists. Based on the Branch Davidian fiasco in Waco, Texas on April 19, 1993, Timothy McVey executed the Oklahoma City bombing on the same day in 1995. In an effort to ‘outdo’ McVey, killers Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold carried out the Columbine High School massacre on April 20, 1999. (Their butchery was delayed one day by a glitch in obtaining munitions.) Virginia Tech gunman Cho referenced the Columbine killers in one of his recorded manifestos. April is also a high profile month for college administrations. Many families and potential students are visiting campus. Virginia Tech was already sullied by four bomb threats on April 13, 2007. The school knew that if there was a lot of publicity about two students who were murdered in a dorm, families might have questioned Virginia Tech’s leadership and commitment to safety. Families might have sent their children elsewhere and Tech would have lost revenue and credibility.”

Dr. Strollo commends the superintendent of the Montgomery County School District for her actions. When she heard via a police dispatcher that students were shot at Tech on April 16, 2007, she ordered the entire public school district into immediate lockdown at 8:52 a.m., almost one hour before the massacre at Norris Hall. What was her motivation? “Safety is our highest priority.” This, according to Strollo, is someone who cares about her students and community. 
The quick thinking of the superintendent has prompted Dr. Strollo to ask repeatedly, “Can someone nominate this woman for governor?”

As she reflects on that April day, Dr. Strollo tries to put the tragedy into perspective. “To notify our own loved ones in an emergency, that is human nature. To not notify the faculty, students, and community, what is that? At best, it is negligence or ineptitude. However, it is unconscionable when ‘leadership’ places the university’s reputation and fundraising above campus safety.”

The Strollos send their love and deepest respect to the families who lost a loved one and to all the survivors and their families. The Strollos are forever indebted to the Virginia Tech and Blacksburg area emergency responders, health care providers, and community. (To be continued)


Thursday, April 6, 2017

DID VIRGINIA TECH BREAK THE LAW?


The above quote is central to the case against Virginia Tech, particularly in examining the actions of school and law enforcement personnel after the double homicide at 7:15 a.m. The school’s nearly two and one-half hour delay in notifying the campus of the killings raised the legal question, did Virginia Tech break the law by violating the Clery Act?

The Clery Act is named for Jeanne Clery, a 19-year old Lehigh University student who was raped and murdered in her campus residence hall in 1986. Clery’s parents found out that students had not been warned about 38 violent crimes on the Lehigh campus in the three years before their daughter’s murder, and helped persuade congress to pass a law making it mandatory to warn students of violent crimes on campus grounds. Violation of the Clery Act can result in a loss of federal funds for any school, fines or both.

With so much at stake, we need to have an understanding of the parameters of the Clery Act, and we also must look at the legal precedents. In other words, when and under what circumstances has it been found that the Clery Act was violated?

The Clery Act encompasses requirements for many aspects of campus security including the reporting and tracking of several types of crimes, starting with murder and going on to include vandalism and hate crimes. The part that concerns us here has to do with notifying the campus population of the occurrence of crimes included on the mandatory reporting list.


The following description of the notification requirements of the Clery Act comes from www.securityoncampus.org. the Web site for the Clery Center for Security On Campus.

Issue timely warnings about Clery Act crimes which pose a serious or ongoing threat to students and employees. Institutions must provide timely warnings in a manner likely to reach all members of the campus community. This mandate has been part of the Clery Act since its inception in 1990. Timely warnings are limited to those crimes an institution is required to report and include in its ASR [Annual Security Report]. There are differences between what constitutes a timely warning and an emergency notification; however both systems are in place to safeguard students and campus employees.

Devise an emergency response, notification and testing policy. Institutions are required to inform the campus community about a “significant emergency or dangerous situation involving an immediate threat to the health or safety of students or employees occurring on the campus.” An emergency response expands the definition of timely warning as it includes both Clery Act crimes and other types of emergencies (i.e., a fire or infectious disease outbreak). Colleges and universities with and without on-campus residential facilities must have emergency response and evacuation procedures in place. Institutions are mandated to disclose a summary of these procedures in place. Institutions are mandated to disclose a summary of these procedures in their ASR. Additionally, a compliance requires one test of the emergency response procedures annually and policies for publicizing those procedures in conjunction with the annual test.

It is clear from this reading of the law that not only are warnings of a murder by an unknown, and at large, gunman required, but they should also be “timely.” It is behind the definition of “timely” that Virginia Tech’s administration decided to hide. But before we examine Tech’s “timely” excuse, let’s look at some schools that have been found guilty of violating the Clery Act.

The case against Eastern Michigan University is the highest fine imposed on an institution. The school was fined $357,500 for failing to warn the campus of a 2006 student's assault and death.

Eastern Michigan University student Laura Dickinson was murdered by a fellow student on December 13, 2006. Dickinson was found in her room four days after her murder. She was naked, a pillow over her head, and there were traces of semen on one leg. The police later said there was “no reason to suspect foul play.” The school therefore did not issue a warning. Ten weeks later, however, student Orange Taylor III was arrested and charged with Dickinson’s murder. It just so happened that Taylor’s arrest occurred on the first day that students could not withdraw from classes and housing and receive a full refund.

After a thorough investigation, the school was found in violation of the Clery Act for not notifying students of the danger. School President John A. Fallon was fired; no reason was given for his termination, but the press reported it was for his apparent role in the cover up. Cindy Hall, the Director of Public Safety and Chief of Police were both relieved of their jobs.

On December 13, 2007, the school settled with Laura Dickinson’s family for $2.5 million. The school did not admit any guilt. Orange Taylor III was convicted of first-degree murder and sexual assault. He was sentenced to life in prison on May 8, 2008.

There is a parallel between Eastern Michigan and Virginia Tech. That parallel is the failure of a school and police officials to warn a campus when confronted with a student homicide. Yes, the lengths of the delays were completely different, but in both cases the schools trivialized a homicide in order to delay a campus-wide notification. Whether you wait over two hours or over two months to warn is irrelevant. The Clery Act calls for a warning to be given to the campus population when a murder occurs on that campus. It does not distinguish between murders by deranged gunmen, murders by rapists and murders caused by a supposed domestic dispute. If someone is found murdered on campus, an immediate warning is called for.

In the case of Virginia Tech, the argument as to whether the school violated the Clery Act has been heated and prolonged. The school’s propaganda campaign has been effective and potent. Virginia Tech, coupled with its powerful allies in Richmond, has persuaded many alumni that it did nothing wrong. In fact, the school has carried out a well-orchestrated public relations campaign, arguing that you cannot be a proud and faithful Hokie and criticize the way the Steger administration handled the events of April 16, 2007.

I would argue that you cannot be a proud Hokie alumnus or alumna and condone the Steger administration’s lack of action on April 16, 2007. For me, there is no doubt—Virginia Tech violated the law. And I am not alone in that opinion. (To be continued)




Wednesday, April 5, 2017

THE VIRGINIA TECH REPORT: MORE PROBLEMS


Let’s take one more look at problems with the Governor’s Review Panel Report (The Addendum) on the Virginia Tech rampage.

 Look at page 75—The second paragraph of the Key Findings simply states the obvious, again an indication of the panel’s timidity and lack of dedication to tackling difficult issues.  

Original Sentences
Reasons for Replacing
My Replacement Sentence
Cho was able to kill 31 people including himself at Norris Hall in about 10 minutes with the semiautomatic handguns at his disposal. Having the ammunition in large capacity magazines facilitated his killing spree.
It simply restates the obvious and adds nothing to the findings.
Cho’s ability to kill 33 people, including himself, is a clear indication of a systemic problem that permeates Virginia’s legal and law enforcement system when it comes to keeping guns out of the hands of those who are a danger to themselves and others.

            On the same page, t
he third and final paragraph of the Key Findings needs to be completely rewritten: 
Original Sentences
Reasons for Replacing
My Replacement Sentences
There is confusion on the part of universities as to what their rights are for setting policy regarding guns on campus.
It does not address Virginia Tech specifically, and is in fact far too general in every respect.
Virginia Tech has one of the tougher policy constraints among Virginia schools concerning possessing guns on campus, yet this did not prevent the killings on April 16, 2007. Moreover, there is confusion on the part of universities in Virginia as to what their rights are for setting policy regarding guns on campus. The panel finds this confusion to be a major weakness in improving campus safety. Moreover, the panel finds that no matter what the policies are, if organizations responsible for keeping guns out of the hands of those who are a danger to themselves or others do not do their job, campus security is seriously undermined. This is evident by the failure to have Cho’s name on the list prohibiting him from purchasing weapons.

Time and time again, the report soft-pedals the mistakes made by the police. Look at the reference to the double homicide at West Ambler Johnston Hall on page 79: “… the police may have made an error in reaching a premature conclusion that their initial lead was a good one, or at least in conveying that impression to the Virginia Tech administration.”  The word “may” needs to be dropped—it was a mistake.

The Governor’s Review Panel Report, The Addendum, failed in so many ways; from a flawed timeline, to critical omissions, to its failure to assign accountability,  the report shied away from what needed to be done: uncover the truth.

 As long as no consequences are assigned, as long as there are no public reprimands, the job remains unfinished. As a consequence, our schools are not as safe as they need to be. It is nothing short of a tragedy that an opportunity has been lost to make a difference, to find some sort of meaning in a horrific crime. As long as people are not held responsible for their actions or inactions, nothing meaningful will be done to protect our campuses.

Many of the actions taken or reasons for not taking actions following the double homicide at Ambler West Johnston Hall were based on pure conjecture.

The Governor’s Review Panel Report represents a singular lack of courage and ethical behavior on the part of politicians on both sides of the aisle; a lack of courage to get at the root of the problem of school shootings, and a lack of willingness to find the truth about the shooting at Virginia Tech. Then-Governor Kaine and then-Attorney General McDonnell both turned blind eyes toward the fictitious timelines concerning “a person of interest” and ignored the TriData conflict of interest. Both men are lawyers. It stretches credibility to the limits to give them a pass on these oversights. As a result of these two men’s inaction, they will, at best, go down in the annals of Virginia history as politicians of monumental smallness.

Kaine and McDonnell sat by as words were used to disguise the truth; it is as if they were complicit in a strategy to investigate without repercussions. Hindsight makes it appear that from the outset Kaine, McDonnell, and other Virginians in positions of authority were bent on marginalizing the truth and ensuring that no one would be held accountable for gross negligence and incompetence.

After extensive reviews of the facts surrounding the events of April 16, 2007, you get the impression people involved in the early response to the shootings were in over their heads. They didn’t know what to do, what to look for, or how to respond correctly to the shooting crisis. None of that is specifically addressed in the Addendum.

Virginia taxpayers were billed over three-quarters of a million dollars for the nefarious conclusions contained in the state’s “official report” on the Virginia Tech shootings—a report that is a blatant attempt to manipulate history and reality. (To be continued)