My new book,
A Handbook For Intelligence And Crime
Analysis, was published July 14th.
It was a
long time in the making but was worth it. There are 18 chapters in the book,
but it contains two important chapters I am especially proud of—one on the Corruption of Intelligence and the other
on Deception Analysis.
The first
should be of interest to everyone because the attempts to manipulate and
distort intelligence by our elected officials have reached epidemic
proportions. Unfortunately, a significant number of elected Republicans,
Democrats, and Tea Party members do not think twice about trying to skew
intelligence. I believe the objectivity, integrity, and honesty of intelligence
products are vital keys to the preservation of our form of representative
government.
Indeed,
perhaps the most valuable service intelligence analysts can perform is to tell
policymakers what they don’t want to hear—analysis that differs from their
bias, prejudices and, in some cases, their policies.
The second
should also be of interest to a large number of readers because it looks at
deception in all its forms as developed and practiced by the Soviet Union
during the Cold War. Terrorists, human and drug traffickers, and a wide variety
of enemies of this country have adopted the principles of Soviet-style
deception. And remember, Vladimir Putin is a former KGB intelligence officer,
so I am sure deception is a major tool in the arsenal.
Deception comes in many forms and is
an every day problem intelligence and crime analysts face. Most texts on
deception concentrate on deception as carried out in a military or political context,
failing to recognize self-deception is a major cause of intelligence failures. A
friend of mine, with over 40 years experience in intelligence, tells his
classes that no analyst can come to a problem or situation with a clean slate.
He or she will always have preconceptions or assumptions. The assumptions may be correct, but the analyst
often does not step back and reevaluate when dealing with a new problem.
Judgments, he says, tend to get firmer in analysts minds and they rarely
revisit them.
Sometimes self-deception and
deceptive practices of the opposition come together and result in devastating
consequences. This textbook reminds, and in some cases, alerts analysts (and
interested non-professionals) to the pitfalls of deception in all forms.