Wednesday, April 11, 2018

THE VIRGINIA TECH CANARD


Following the slaughter at Virginia Tech, the Governor set up a blue ribbon panel to analyze the rampage. The net result was a badly flawed report that does not address the problems central to the causes behind the shooting. The third and final version of the report, known as The Addendum, shies away from making the tough recommendations needed to get at the heart of the problem and prevent future shootings on school grounds.

Unlike Colorado’s Columbine report, which was written by the panel members who analyzed that shooting, Virginia Tech hired a firm that had done business with the state (Arlington-based TriData) to do the drafting; a conflict of interest. TriData was paid around $700,000. Virginia Tech bought and paid for the report it wanted; a report analyzing the tragedy in such a way to gloss over incompetence and call no one’s actions or inactions into question.

I have read the report several times and each time I come away scratching my head. The sheer size of the report is noteworthy, but its failure to face up to what needs to be done—hold people accountable for their actions and inactions—makes The Addendum an exercise in futility.

The report did not address issues such as identifying mistakes in judgment and the individuals who should be held accountable for their actions or inactions. Indeed, the report is an amazing exercise in avoiding accountability and legal liability.

The investigating panel should have written the report in order to avoid any hint of conflict of interest. It is bad enough that a state panel examined the behavior of state employees and the state’s largest university to determine if there was any malfeasance, but not one member of the victims’ families was a panel member. The state did pay for a family representative and spokesperson on the panel. But, who was paying the representative and to whom did the representative owe loyalty? The state—again, a conflict of interest that is hardly conducive to impartiality.

Several key players declined to cooperate with the review panel. I find that lack of cooperation disheartening and puzzling. Specifically, the Virginia State Police, the ATF, and the gun dealers “declined to provide the panel with copies of the applications” Seung Hui Cho completed when he bought the weapons that would eventually kill over thirty innocent people. The report notes that “the Virginia State Police … did describe the contents of Cho’s gun purchase applications to members of the panel and its staff.” The state police’s willingness to “describe” is a limp attempt to explain their failure to cooperate and provide the panel with documents. This lack of cooperation is a lethal flaw in the report—it is inexcusable.

The panel was impeded in its work by the FOIA rules that did not allow more than two members to meet together or speak by phone without it being considered a public meeting. This is bureaucracy at its worst. The report needs to be more specific in detailing the problems this bureaucratic obstacle presented.

The report sugarcoats glaring errors and problems. For example, the report on page 10, talks about the findings and recommendations in the report being two different kinds. One, “What was done well,” and two, “What could have been done better.” The report should have exposed people in positions of authority failing to do their jobs—“could have been done better” is backing away from holding individuals and institutions accountable for their actions.

In this same vein, the report says that the police may have made an error in reaching the premature conclusion that their initial lead was a good one and that the person of interest was probably not on campus. May have made an error? The Virginia Tech Police did make a very serious error by jumping to a premature conclusion and giving the wrong impression to school officials. This error should never be glossed over.

The report appears to make excuses for the failure of the university’s Policy Group to put out a campus-wide alert following the discovery of the first two bodies. The previous August, the university had put out an alert that a convict named William Morva had escaped from a nearby prison and killed a law enforcement officer and a guard. The alert indicated that the murderer was on the loose and could be on campus. The university set its own standard in August of 2006 by issuing that alert, and then violated that standard in April 2007. Lives would have been saved had that alert gone out; the report skirts around this critical point.

In sum, The Addendum fails to do its job in critical areas; it is bland, and raises no real red flags. The report is the equivalent of reading a book with no thesis. The recommendations indicate this or that “should” be done. The “shoulds” relate to such things as analyzing, training, complying with this or that act, police being members of panels, and so on and so forth. Yes, these “shoulds” need to be done. But, nowhere does the report say that individuals should be held accountable for their actions or inactions; that organizations and individuals must be held accountable when they break their own standards and over 30 lives are lost.

One member of the Panel reported that from the outset panel members felt under pressure to produce a report that would not lead to litigation.

The report may be impressive in size, but it is unimpressive in content. The report falls short of what it needed to do…make clear that everyone in a position of responsibility must be held to standards of safety and that failure to meet those standards will result in stiff penalties. Instead, readers are left wandering from page to page in an effort to tie ends together and make these conclusions for themselves.  (To be continued)  

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