Distortions of military
intelligence have happened many times in this nation’s history. One of the most
notable was in 1967, when an intense intra-Intelligence Community battle was
waged mainly between the CIA and military intelligence in Saigon over the
strength of the Viet Cong.
That battle
centered on the strength of the Viet Cong prior to the Tet offensive. The CIA
had intelligence that the Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam numbered over
500,000. General Westmoreland’s intelligence unit in Saigon, U.S. Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), insisted the figure was no higher than
300,000.
The dispute
culminated in the production of a National Intelligence Estimate in the fall of
1967 using the MACV figures. The CIA, despite strong opposition from its
Vietnam specialists, caved in and went along with the lower figure.
The nagging
questions are, would U.S. forces fighting in South Vietnam been better prepared
to counter the Tet offensive had they known the enemy’s true strength? Would
U.S. lives have been saved?
For a thorough
examination and analysis of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, see George Allen’s, None So Blind. (To be continued)
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